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Introduction   
On the amodal view of mental representation, as proposed by Fodor (1975) or Fodor and 
Pylyshyn (1988), whether the referent of a representation is perceived, motorically interacted 
with, thought of or imagined, does not bear on the format of representation. Representations are 
symbolic structures and are defined through how those structures combine with other internal 
representations and their combinatorial properties. According to Fodor, there is a “language of 
thought” that doesn’t share a common representation format with the perceptual and motorical 
ways in which we acquire information about the world.    
    A direct consequence of this view is that the information “conveyed by a mental 
representation is autonomous from perceptual systems, bodily actions, and their operational 
details” (Wilson and Foglia 2017). For example, the concept TABLE is autonomous from both 
our bodily experiences with tables and the physical and functional characteristics of tables. In 
other words, the same representation is activated when TABLE is, for example, written or 
spoken about.        
   To counter this sort of view, psychologists and neuroscientists have argued that the format of 
representation is modality-specific (e.g., Pecher et al. 2004; Zwaan and Yaxley 2003; Glenberg 
and Kaschak 2002; Martin and Chao 2001; Solomon and Barsalou 2001; Martin et alia 2000; 
Spivey et alia 2000). When we think of tables or imagine them, our brains reactivate the same 
neuronal structures as when we perceive tables or when we bodily interact with them. Put 
metaphorically, mental representation is embodied in the sense that our brain “simulates” 
modality-specific representations.1     
   A direct consequence of embodiment is that sensory and motor processes also play a crucial 
role in the linguistic representation of such things as tables and cups. Terms such as “table” and 
“cup” are considered to reactivate sensory and motor patterns of brain activity when written or 
spoken about.    																																																								
1 For a thorough criticism of embodied cognition see Machery (2007).    
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   In the modes of an embodied view of mental representation and word meaning, this paper is 
concerned with the embodying of abstract artifact terms. Publically accessible meanings for such 
concepts as PIECE OF MUSIC, PAINTING and NOVEL are characterized in French in terms of 
a productive action term.2 A productive action term is a term that refers to a productive action 
rather than to an action of use. Le Robert historique (1992, 1295), for example, characterizes 
“music” (“musique”) as the art of combining sounds (“art de combiner les sons”). But why is 
that? Why do we describe an abstract artifact as an art of combining sounds? 3     
    One answer is that language reflects that we in fact tend to think of abstract artifacts in terms 
of the actions that lead to their creations. Another answer is that connections between abstract 
artifact terms such as “piece of music”, “painting” and “novel” and productive action terms such 
as “composing” and “writing” are just arbitrary semantic relations encoded in language. In 
accordance with the amodal view of mental representation we might think that the fact that we 
speak and think of certain abstract artifacts in terms of productive action concepts does not 
reflect whether and how we perceptually and motorically interact with such things as pieces of 
music, novels and paintings. Rather, mental representations of such things as pieces of music, 
novels, and paintings relate to internal symbols whose combination defines the representation 
format of such concepts as PIECE OF MUSIC, PAITING and NOVEL.                               
    In this paper, I am going to argue for an embodied view of the relationships between abstract 
artifact concepts and productive action concepts. On an embodied view of mental representation, 
I will suggest that the reason why we speak and think about abstract artifacts in terms of 
productive actions concepts is because sensory-motor representations of the final states of 
productive actions and the result states of the created result objects play a constitutive role in 
																																																								
2 We just need to google to see that English dictionaries offer the same meanings for “composition” and “a piece of 
music”.   
3 Abstract artifacts are artifacts that are not defined by their physical realizations. A novel is more than just the 
sequences of symbols, and a piece of music is more than just a sequence of sounds.   
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abstract artifact representation.4 More generally, I will argue that the representations that play a 
crucial role in the action of producing artifacts also play a crucial role in thinking and speaking 
of abstract artifacts.5    
    To develop this kind of view, I will clarify the notions of “productive action”, “final state of a 
productive action”, “result state” and “result object” in section 1. Then, in section 1.1., I will 
introduce synchronic English data of deverbal abstract artifact nouns (nouns deriving from 
productive action verbs) that are rather compatible with an amodal view of abstract artifact 
representations and compare it in section 1.2. with Latin data of deverbal abstract artifact nouns 
that is not only compatible with the amodal view of mental representation but also with the 
embodied view of metal representation. Then, in section 2, I will outline my embodied view of 
immediate result object representations (that is, of just created artifacts) and I will provide an 
evolutionary argument for the embodying of abstract artifact concepts in the sections 3 and 4. 
The basic idea of the argument is that if the perception of immediate result objects during artifact 
production can be embodied in sensory motor representations, then also abstract artifact 
representations can be embodied in the very sorts of sensory-motor representations.      
    The paper will conclude with a prospect of how to plausibly underpin the philosophical view 
of abstract artifact representations with neuro-scientific methods of testing. Since showing that 
abstract concepts are embodied has always been a challenge for the embodied views of mental 
representations (for a recent review see Pecher et al. 2011), neuro-scientifically proving that 
abstract artifact concepts are embodied would increase the plausibility of the embodied view of 
mental representation as an overall framework.                                     
 
1.  Preliminary Notions: Productive Actions, Final States of Productive Actions, 
Result Objects, and Result States    																																																								
4 An understanding of the term “sensory-motor” is provided in section 2.   
5 This move presupposes that the claim that action concepts can be/are embodied in sensory-motor representations is 
true. For an idea how this is supposed to work, see Gallese and Lakoff (2005).       
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Before providing linguistic data for the semantic connections between abstract artifact concepts 
and productive action concepts, let me begin with clarifying the notions of productive actions, 
result objects, result states and finale states of productive actions that build the foundations of my 
embodied view of abstract artifact representation.6 A productive action is an action that results in 
a new object. For example, the action of composing in the musical domain is a productive action 
that results in a new object, namely, in a piece of music. Call this new object a result object. 
Furthermore, we tend to think of certain artifacts in terms of result states, namely, those object 
properties that are brought into existence by the productive actions that lead to the result objects 
in question. To give a simple example of the metaphysical relation between a productive action 
and its result object, consider a Lego flower. A Lego flower made from composed Lego blocks is 
a result object of composing. However, the property of being composed of the result object is 
also a result of the productive action in question, namely, the action that culminates in its final 
state of composing when the action is completed.7       
To get a better grasp of the issue, contrast the described metaphysical relationship between 
productive actions and their result objects to how manipulations of use relate to their objects. 
Unlike in the case of productive actions, manipulations of use are not productive in the sense of 
creating an artifact: being grasped is not an essential artifact property of a cup.8 That is, as such a 
cup is not a grasped object. A grasped cup is a manipulated cup, but it is not the grasping that 
makes the cup an artifact.9     
 
1.1.  Multiple Readings of Deverbal Nouns  																																																								
6 This clarification will be very schematic and it will leave out the question of the individuation of a productive 
action. You can compose a paper by speaking into a recording device, or by typing on your laptop. However, these 
differences don’t affect the idea that there is an overall structure to a productive action, and that overall structure is 
what I’m concerned with in this section.    
7 One might disagree that the property of being composed is brought into existence by the productive action if one 
doesn’t believe in creation. That controversy can’t be addressed in this paper.  
8 For a more specific understanding of an artifact property, see Baker (2007).  
9 One might think: But if grasping is crucial for the function of these objects, then why doesn’t it play a crucial role 
in their creation as well? The answer is that even if grasping might play a crucial role in the creation of certain 
objects we can still distinguish between grasping as part of creation and sheer grasping as use.    
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In this section, I would like to look at English deverbal nouns that are often used to describe 
artifacts. Deverbal nouns are nouns that morphologically derive from verbs. To say that a noun 
morphologically derives from a verb is to say that the verb stem of the verb has been used as a 
basis of derivation of the noun, and not the noun stem for deriving the verb in question. For 
example, the noun “composition” derives from the verb “composing”, the noun “painting” 
derives from the verb “painting”, the noun “writing” from the verb “writing”, etc. Interestingly, 
most deverbal nouns that describe certain artifacts also describe the productive actions 
themselves as well as the final states of the productive actions in question and the result states of 
the objects resulting from the productive actions in question. Let us look at the case of 
“composition”. For example, when we speak of the following phenomena, we describe by 
“composition” either the result states of the things in question or the final states of the productive 
actions in question:      
 
(1) “The composition of Beethoven’s 5th is fascinating”,   
(2) “the composition of light and shadow in Van Gogh’s paintings is magical”,  
(3) “Moevenpick – the fine composition” (online Moevenpick advertisement).10  
 
 
    In (1), “composition” is not used to describe Beethoven’s 5th itself but the result state of 
composing. In other words, when we say that the composition of Beethoven’s 5 is fascinating, 
we describe a property of the property of composing. Also (2) describes certain properties of the 
object that result from composing, without “composition” describing the result object itself. 
When we say that the composition of light and shadow in Van Gogh’s paintings is magical, we 
say something about the painting, and do not necessarily describe the painting itself by 
“composition”. The same can be said about (3), that is, the phrase “the fine composition” 
describes something about the brand Moevenpick, say, the result state of the thing in question, 
and doesn’t denote the thing itself.        
																																																								
10 The source for this is http://www.moevenpick-finefoods.com/product/die-edle-komposition/?lang=en.  
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 But one might think that the very fact that one and the same noun can describe different 
metaphysical categories shows that the relationship between a concept and its format of 
representation can’t be modality specific. The way we talk and think about artifacts does not 
reflect what artifacts are and how they have been made. In other words, one might think that the 
data just is a confirmation of the amodal view of mental representation.    
 
1.1  Latin Result State Terms as Means of Conceptualizing Certain Abstract   
Artifacts   
In order to counter the view that the linguistic data above doesn’t suggest that sensory and motor 
engagements with artifacts play a role in abstract artifact representation, let us look at how Latin 
perfect (passives) participles, in short Latin P(P)Ps, are used to conceptualize artifacts. Latin 
P(P)Ps either directly serve to conceptualize artifacts or are used to derive specific nouns for 
describing artifacts. Here are then some examples that demonstrate how artifacts are 
conceptualized in Latin:                
            
(4) “notae” (note), nominalized PP in the feminine form of “noscere” (noting),  
(5) “manuscript” (manuscript) from “manu”, ablative form of “manus” (hand), and 
“scriptus” (written), PP of “scribere” (action of writing), 
(6) “scriptura” (writing) comes from “scriptum” (written), nominalized PPP of 
“scribere” (action of writing).     
 
     
    Such morphological derivations in Latin seem to be particularly interesting because P(P)Ps 
form the grammatical category of executed actions, such as having noted, having written, and 
having sculptured.11 This data is interesting because it is true that a piece of music is composed, 
and that a novel is written. However, if the amodal view of mental representation is true, it 
should be an arbitrary fact that it is the feature of a result state of a result object that serves for 
conceptualizing abstract artifacts. Call this the Arbitrariness Thesis.    
																																																								
11 Interestingly, also (7) the English noun “artifact” is derived from “factum” (made) plus ablative form of “ars” (art 
or skill).   
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Arbitrariness Thesis: There is no deep reason why language encodes some of the 
abstract artifacts in terms of characteristics features of their making processes.   
 
   Contra this thesis, I will argue that language sometimes encodes certain abstract artifacts in 
terms of productive action terms because we in fact represent abstract artifacts in terms of the 
sensory-motor processes that lead to their creations.12 There is, for example, sufficient evidence 
that the PPP “scriptum” (or “scripta” in plural and nominalized) has been introduced for the 
artifact itself, although, as (6) illustrates, there is also the noun “scriptura” for denoting the 
artifact itself. Here is a paradigm example for “scripta”:   
 
(8) “Verba volant, scripta manent” (spoken words fly away, written words remain). 
 
    Here, “scripta”, the plural form of “scriptum”, is used to describe the written words, that is, the 
result object of the action of writing although there was also “scriptura” for the artifact itself.    
Why is that? Why is the PPP preferred to the actual noun? One might think: If it did not play 
any role for conceptualization whether words happen to be written or not, then “scriptura” would 
have served the same purpose -- especially because “scriptura” has multiple meanings and 
doesn’t only denote the result object of writing, but also the action of writing.   
   However, note that we do not need to focus on (8) to make the point. One might object that (8) 
is not a good example of a conceptualization of an artifact in terms of a PPP, since, in (8), 
“scripta” marks the difference between written and spoken than describe words themselves. To 
undermine this objection, let me provide a different paradigm case for “scripta” describing an 
artifact:     
   (9) “Latina scripta” (Latin scripts)  																																																								
12 One might object, as Louise Antony has done, that it’s not clear what it means to say that abstract artifacts are 
represented in terms of the sensory-motor processes that lead to their creations, since you could compose a novel by 
speaking into a recorder, by moving a pen across paper, or by typing on a keyboard – which are all motor routines 
but still different processes. While this might be true, the point is that I deny that they are different processes. On the 
face of it, it seems that it couldn’t be denied that these different processes have one thing in common: they are all 
sensory-motor processes.   
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    Here, “scripta” surely does not highlight the written as opposed to the spoken but rather 
denotes the result object itself.13 And it’s an interesting question why.                
 
2. An Embodied View of Mental Representation   
Analogous to the linguistic data that we looked at in section 1.2.,14 I would like to first propose an 
embodied view of the mental processing and representation of immediate result objects and then 
discuss a potential objection to the application of the view to abstract artifacts concepts, i.e., the 
concepts that we looked at in section 1.1. If we can make the case for immediate result objects to 
be represented in terms of sensory-motor representations, then we might explain why language 
makes use of action result state terms in order to describe abstract artifacts. The basic idea 
behind the antecedent of this conditional claim is threefold. Call the idea in question the Result 
Representation View.        
  
The Result Representation View:   
 
(i.) When we productively engage with material objects, our representations of our 
engagements are sensory-motor representations.  
(ii.) These sensory-motor representations are not only representations of our 
productive actions but also representations of the result states of result objects.  
(iii.) Sensory-motor representations of the result states of result objects are also 
integrated with the sensory-motor representations of final states of productive 
actions.  
     
    To begin with (i.), we need first of all to understand what “sensory-motor” means. To do so, 
let’s look at a quote from Bompas et al. (2002, 90) that describes the hypothesis of the sensory-
motor contingency theory15:     																																																								
13 Some of the data presented in this section is available at http://www.zeno.org/Georges-1913.  
14 Note that the linguistic data presented so far is at most evidence for the view that some abstract artifact nouns are 
represented in the way I am going to suggest. There are numerous counter-examples to the idea that abstract artifact 
terms derive from productive action terms. For example, the English verb “texting” has been derived from the noun 
“text”. Thus, prima facie, it would be wrong to claim that the linguistic data that I have presented suggests that all 
abstract artifact nouns are represented in the way that I am going to suggest. Rather, if I am right, then representing 
an abstract artifact in terms of a sensory-motor representation might at most be one way of representing an abstract 
artifact.   
15 To get a complete view of the technical notion of a sensory-motor contingency and further references, see 
O’Regan and Noë (2001).  
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The sensorimotor contingency theory hypothesises that our experience of a rich, colourful, environment 
derives not simply from the information originating from sensory input channels, but also from the laws 
that these signals obey when the observer or the stimulus move.  
     
    Analogously, I claim that when we act on manipulable objects such as Lego blocks to create 
new objects, there are no distinct motor representations of our actions and distinct 
representations of our perceptions of the things in question, but we have representations that 
couple action and perception.     
Then, as to (ii.), the idea is that representing the result state of a newly created item must be 
part of representing a newly created item. Based on the idea that sensory and motor 
representations are integrated, I call the sensory and motor representations of the result states of 
newly created items “sensory-motor result representations”.    
Furthermore, the representations of final states of productive actions must be integrated, if 
they are not even identical with, the sensory-motor representations of the result states of the 
created objects. That is, there must be a specific moment of recognition of the sort “I have done 
this amazing work”, or “I have created a new item” when we complete a productive action.  
 
2.1. Why Posit Result Representations?     
To see why we need to posit result representations as being the format in which at least 
immediate result objects are sensory-motorically represented, consider the following principle. 
Call it the Underlying Principle.   
  
Underlying Principle: If sensory-motor result representations play a crucial role in 
the representation of composable objects, then they also play a crucial role in the 
representation of the immediate result objects.   
 
 
    To begin with the antecedent claim, let me introduce Gibsonian (1979) affordances and then 
apply the notion to the case of productive actions. 16  Affordances are action possibilities 
																																																								
16 For a critical view of the notion of affordance see, for example, Siegel (2014).   
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correlating with physical structures. According to the Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, 
“meanings” of things in the environment can be “directly perceived” and they invite to acting in 
certain ways. For example, the action possibility of sit-on-able plays a crucial role in the 
perception of a chair and the action possibility of drink-from-able plays a crucial role in the 
perception of a cup. However, we can also distinguish between action possibilities for 
individuals depending on the individual’s physical traits. While a toddler might be able to crawl 
under a bed, an adult might not. Thus, while a toddler might perceive that she can crawl under a 
bed, an adult might perceive that she can’t crawl under a bed.           
Now, to apply affordances to the case of productive actions, consider the following 
comparison between use and production. To begin with use, suppose that the following is true 
about use: given the composition and layout of a chair, an adult can directly perceive that she can 
sit on the chair. Now, what would an adult directly perceive in the case of production?  
Intuitively, the following seems plausible: the things that we directly perceive in the context 
of production are loose individual items such as Lego blocks.17 In other words, it seems that Lego 
blocks are the kinds of things that can serve the production of new items.18 Lego blocks can be 
processed in terms of the action possibility of composable, and if so then we must probably 
know what composed Lego blocks look like in order to compose, say, a Lego flower.   
Now, the question is where do we get this knowledge? As I see it, it is the recalling of 
representations as discussed in (i.-iii.) that play a role in knowing what composed Lego blocks 
look like.19 Likewise, if I process musical items or words and phrases in terms of the action 
possibility of composable, then I probably must also know how to compose musical items, words 
and phrases, i.e., I must represent not only the action of composing itself and culmination of 
																																																								
17 Or, in order to already provide examples for abstract artifacts: musical tones, or phrases and words are loose items 
that we can put together and thus should also process in terms of composable.     
18 As I see it, things like chairs and cups are unlikely to be processed in terms of composable. But one might disagree 
here depending on one’s deep metaphysical views and commitments. I can’t address the issue here.    
19 Now, there is still the important question whether one needs to have an intuitive idea or concept for producing the 
artifact or whether one can just experiment. I will address this important matter in section 3.  
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composing but also the result states of the potential result objects. If this is the case, then 
Underlying Principle is true.     
 
2.2. Sensory-Motor Result Representations of Abstract Artifact Concepts    
Note that my example for productive actions possibilities in section 2.1. was mainly the making 
of a Lego flower out of Lego blocks, and not the making of an abstract artifact such as a novel or 
a musical work. Therefore, I need to address the following question. Call it the Expert Question.  
 
Expert Question: What about the expert aspect of such productive actions as writing a 
novel or writing/composing a piece of music?   
  
  
One might think that a great part of creating abstract artifacts goes beyond sensory and motor 
capacities. That is, someone who composes a musical piece is normally a music expert whose 
know-how goes beyond putting together perceptual entities such as musical tons and rhythms. 
Likewise, one might think that someone who writes a novel is normally a literary expert whose 
know-how to write a novel goes beyond the motorical writing of a piece of text on paper, etc. 
Call this non-sensory-motor part of know-how “amodal know-how”.20         
To react to this sort of criticism, I simply suggest decoupling productive action concepts from 
expert knowledge. That is, I suggest that we think of composing in the musical domain in the 
way we think of composing a Lego flower from Lego blocks. Although non-experts might not be 
able to create pieces of music, non-experts might be able to gain conceptual access to abstract 
composing processes in virtue of their basic composition knowledge. In order to make this idea 
sensible, that is, that it might be principally possible to mentally access more complex kinds of 
composing processes in terms of the more basic kinds, I will first say more on amodal know-how 
and then provide an evolutionary argument for the embodying of amodal know-how.     
																																																								
20 Note that the same sort of thing also holds for the non-expert: Anyone who writes a novel doesn’t just put words 
and sentences together. Anyone who composes a piece of music does more than putting musical tones and rhythm 
together.   
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3. An Evolutionary Argument for Embodied Know-How  
3.1. Amodal Know-How   
What exactly is amodal know-how? In analytic metaphysics (e.g., Thomasson 2007, Hilpinen 
2011), it is assumed that the result object of a productive action is not simply the outcome of a 
productive action culminating in its final state, but that it is also the result of a corresponding 
productive intention of the author to make an object of a certain kind. According to Hilpinen’s 
(2011, italics added) Dependence Condition,    
 
the existence and some of the properties of an artifact depend on an author’s intention to make an object of 
a certain kind.  
 
 
    And since an intention is neither perceptual nor motoric, amodal representations must play a 
crucial role in producing artifact. Here is a further statement by Hilpinen (ibid., italics added) 
that confirms the view that artifact production crucially depends on amodal representations:     
 
An author’s productive intention is often expressed by cognitive artifacts which show the character of the 
intended artifact and the way it should be constructed, for example, a drawing, a diagram, or a model of the 
artifact, together with a list of parts and materials and a set of instructions (a precept) for the production 
process. Such representations are especially important in the case of collectively produced complex 
artifacts.   
 
While the notion of a collectively produced artifact is an interesting one, let us concentrate on 
the notion of a cognitive artifact. The labeling of such things as a list of parts and materials, a set 
of instructions as well as models, diagrams and drawings as “cognitive artifacts” sounds as if 
artifact representations are amodal representations, that is, representations that are not properly 
embedded in the environment in which productive intentions are executed.     
Supposing that this is the view, I submit that there is a problem for it: Even if we suppose that 
it is true that making artifacts also involves an intention to make it, it is still an interesting 
question where productive intentions and artifact concepts come from. And, as I see it, the 
proponent of amodal know-how can’t adequately answer that question. That is, the defender of 
amodal know-how cannot suppose that we have developed artifact concepts and according 
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productive intentions in virtue of sensory-motor interactions with worldly items. Rather, she has 
to presuppose the having of corresponding intentions and concepts in order to explain where the 
very productive intentions and concepts come from. And, this is not only circular, but also 
counter-intuitive.      
According to what I call the Intuition from First Creation, we don’t need the concepts for 
making the artifact. And if we don’t need the concepts for making the artifact, then it is justified 
for us to believe that artifact production knowledge is embodied. However, before getting to this 
last step, let me first describe the intuition from first creation.  
 
3.2. The Intuition from First Creation     
How were we able to produce artifacts before we possessed corresponding intentions and 
concepts? Put differently, how were our ancestors able to create artifacts? When our ancestors 
made the very first objects they presumably did not have intentions to create them. According to 
me, both first artifact concepts and productive intentions come from discovery and observation, 
and that speaks for the embodied view of abstract artifact representations. However, this move 
isn’t available to the defender of amodal know-how.   
    To support the intuition from the first creation, let me provide an example of a productive 
activity from anthropological theory that I take to not require concepts and intentions, but whose 
result objects I would call an “artifact”. In his book An Anthropological Analysis of Food-
Getting Technology (1976), Oswalt argues that artifacts can be characterized in terms of the 
actions that lead to their creations, and those actions in turn can be reduced to a small number of 
basic ones, such as separation and conjunction. For example, the making of a walking stick by 
breaking a limb from a tree and stripping it out of leaves and barks can be understood in terms of 
the productive action of separating one object from another, and doesn’t require positing any 
specific action types such as breaking and stripping in order to explain the artifact production. 
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More importantly, we can provide an evolutionary account of artifacts by appealing to a limited 
set of productive activities.      
Now, what is at issue for our purposes is that the execution of the actions that Oswalt 
characterizes doesn’t seem to necessitate any concepts or/and intentions.21 In particular, it is 
plausible to suppose that the very first walking stick made from the limb of a tree was the result 
of spontaneous interaction with worldly items and the result of observing how a productive 
action culminates in the result state of a result object. By spontaneously reaching for a tree limb 
and grasping it, an ancestor might have been able to put force on the limb and break it. However, 
having observed that result, an ancestor might then have been able to repeat the mindless action, 
that is, “separate” the leaves from the limb by stripping it. As I see it, this is a way to 
characterize the basic action of separation to which a number of productive actions reduce to 
without having to posit any specific productive action concepts or any specific productive 
intentions. Before describing how one could build on this view to explain the representation of 
abstract artifact concepts, let me also explain how the defender of amodal know-how might want 
to explain first creations, and why her explanation doesn’t work.     
 
3.3. Considering A Reply by the Proponent of Amodal Know-How    
How could the defender of amodal know-how explain first creations? Maybe, she could explain 
first creations by appealing to innate concepts. According to Fodor (1975, 1981), concepts such 
as CAR and DOG are not acquired experientially. When children are presented with certain 
items they only acquire the words for the items in questions, and not the concepts. This is so 
because children are already born with the concepts. They don’t learn them through experience.22  
																																																								
21 One might object that if the ancestor doesn’t intend to use the stick as an aid to walking, it isn’t a walking stick. 
But this seems to be a terminological point. If the ancestor creates one and starts using it for walking, then it simply 
is a walking stick.     
22 Note: Fodor revises his view of concepts in The Elm and the Expert (1994) where he assumes that concepts can be 
acquired (by a process he calls “triggering”), which is not the same as learning, but which doesn’t entail that all 
concepts are innate. Thanks to Louise Antony for pointing this out.  
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   Many philosophers have argued that it is very implausible that such concepts as CAR and 
DOG are innate. Hilary Putnam (1988, 15), for example, has claimed that Fodor’s theory is 
incompatible with the theory of evolution. Putnam says:      
 
To have given us an innate stock of notions which includes carburetor, bureaucrat, quantum potential, etc., 
as required by Fodor’s version of the Innateness Hypothesis, evolution would have had to be able to 
anticipate all the contingencies of future physical and cultural environments. Obviously it didn’t and 
couldn’t do this.  
 
 
    I agree with this verdict, that is, that it is unlikely that the mentioned concepts are innate. 
Analogously, I have pointed out in the previous section that it is rather plausible that our very 
first productive action concepts were gained from worldly interactions and that more complex 
kinds of concepts are linked to more basic kinds of concepts. But the defender of amodal know-
how might reply that if our ancestors didn’t have the corresponding artifact concepts when 
making the artifacts, then she doesn’t think that the things our ancestors were able to produce 
were in fact artifacts. However, the problem with such a reply is it doesn’t enable us to explain 
where productive intentions and corresponding concepts come from. Just because the amodal 
know-how view suggests that artifacts are creations dependent on humans intending to make 
them, we want to know how we come to intend to make artifacts. The advantage of supposing 
that the very first things that were created are “artifacts” is that we can actually provide a 
satisfying answer to the question where artifact concepts and productive intentions come from.      
 
4. From Embodied Know-How to Sensory-Motor Result Representations  
Based on what we said in section 3.3, my argument for the embodying of artifact production 
knowledge can be formulated as follows. Call it the Embodying Argument.   
     
Embodying Argument: If we suppose that our very first productive interactions with 
material objects were shaped by discovery and observation experiences (whether or not 
these interactions can count as “artifact” production), then we can explain where both 
productive action concepts and productive intentions come from.   
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    In modus ponens form the Embodying Argument goes as follows:    
I. First creations are results of discovery and observation experiences.  
II. If first creations are results of discovery and observation experiences, then artifact 
production knowledge is embodied in sensory-motor result representations.   
III. Therefore, artifact production knowledge is embodied in sensory-motor result 
representations.  
 
 
    Based on prior discussion of both the threefold idea of a sensory-motor result representation in 
section 2 and our discussion of the previous section, the core premise to be defended in my 
evolutionary argument for embodied know-how is premise II. This seems necessary since one 
might think that even if we suppose that it is true that first creations are the results of discovery 
and observation experiences, it does not follow that artifact production knowledge is embodied 
in sensory-motor result representations.          
    Here is a response to that: If we think of sensory-motor representations as a source of gestalt 
principles, then it is plausible to assume that during and right after a first creation there must 
have been a visual recording of the culmination of a productive action in its final state and thus 
in the result state of the created object – providing a basis for the tradition of artifact production 
knowledge.23 Werning (2012), for example, has argued that although object representations are 
decomposable into meaningful features such as color, orientation, shape, we neuronally represent 
whole objects. Maybe, we could make an analogous argument for the case of abstract artifact 
representations. If we were to discover that sensory-motor result representations provide the 
basis for explaining gestalt principles in the case of abstract result objects representations, we 
would have some reason to believe in the adaptational anchoring of abstract artifact concepts in 
sensory-motor result representations.24     
 																																																								
23 Note that this isn’t supposed to make any assumptions about how individuals acquire productive intentions. 
Rather, it is supposed to provide a picture of the acquisition of productive intentions by the human species as a 
whole.   
24 A drawback of my embodied cognition view is that it doesn’t address the question how blind people can compose, 
paralyzed people can compose, and deaf people can compose. As we know, these are the sorts of challenges that any 
embodied view of mental representation struggles with. Thanks to Louise Antony for pointing this out.         
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5. Concluding Remarks  
To sum up, I have argued for an embodied view of abstract artifact representation from a non-
scientific point of view. On my philosophical view, we have evolutionary reasons to believe that 
abstract artifact representations are embodied in sensory-motor result representations. The merits 
of the view are threefold: we can explain close connections between Latin PPPs and artifact 
terms, we are able to link basic kinds of productive action concepts to their “abstract” kinds, and 
we can accommodate the intuition from first creations. Whether it is neuro-scientifically 
confirmable that we represent pieces of music and other sorts of abstract artifacts in terms of 
sensory-motor result representations (that are available to non-experts) and whether we do so 
every time we think about musical compositions and other sorts of abstract artifacts is a topic I 
leave to neuroscientists.25       
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